Reply Comments Filed on PD Approving Voluntary Allocations and Modifying the Market Offer Process

CalCCA:

• PG&E and SCE’s arguments against removing their “waived claims” language regarding remedies for violations related to MO solicitations should be rejected because remedies for IOU violations of the approved MO process should be significant enough to deter the prohibited behavior.
• SDG&E’s request to allow IOU employees to transfer between market offer bid and evaluation teams after bids are submitted should be rejected due to the potential IOU competitive advantage. After bids are submitted, additional negotiations may occur between the evaluation team and bidders, so an employee with knowledge of IOU information/strategy concerning the IOU’s bid should not be part of that continuing evaluation/negation process.
• The PD should be clarified, as requested by SCE, to ensure that all PCIA-eligible RPS energy remaining after the Voluntary Allocation is offered in the Market Offer as required by the Phase 2 Decision. Therefore, OP 3 of the PD should be revised to remove the phrase “short-term,” to read: "Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Southern California Edison Company, and San Diego Gas & Electric Company are approved to offer 100 percent of their remaining Power Charge Indifference Adjustment eligible short-term contracts in the Market Offer."

SDG&E:

• The Commission should reject CalCCA’s protest to reject bid floors in MOs. SDG&E claims that CalCCA’s argument for rejecting bid floors is based on factual errors and that because the MO process has not commenced, CalCCA cannot know whether participants will game the Voluntary Allocation pricing mechanism by procuring RPS supply in the MO at below the price floor.
• The Commission should reject CalCCA’s proposed schedule for the IOUs’ MOs because it is not achievable. SDG&E argues that the proposed schedule is unworkable because 1) CalCCA’s schedule has the IOUs submit their revised pro forma contracts instructed by the PD during the week of November 7, but SDG&E has not yet received a disposition from the Commission on their AL requesting approval of its MO pro forma agreements, and that disposition may require SDG&E to make Commission-directed modifications on their pro forma contracts outside of those included on the PD, 2) MO bidders would be formulating bids based on terms and conditions in the pro forma contracts that would not yet have been approved and that may change, and 3) IOUs notifying participants of selected bids on January 6, 2023 would need to execute agreements no later than one week later, which SDG&E finds unworkable.
• SDG&E sees potential merit in CalCCA’s alternate proposal to modify the PD to allow LSEs to bid different percentages for 2023 and 2024 to compensate for the shortened 2023 calendar year deliveries, because it could give market participants the opportunity to make up the expected truncated annual volumes through its offer(s). SDG&E states this alternate proposal could remedy the concern that material delays to the MO schedule would make CalCCA’s proposal to ensure LSEs receive full value for 2023 MO purchases unworkable.
• SDG&E agrees with CalCCA that the Commission should remove the long-term in this first MO, if necessary, to ensure that MO deliveries occur expeditiously. SDG&E believes that it could commence these long-term sales in its MO process expeditiously, but if resolving outstanding issues in the long-term MO process delays commencement of the entire MO process, a large amount of value will be lost to customers, so thus SDG&E would urge the Commission to instruct the IOUs in its Final Decision to solicit sales of all volumes as short-term sales in the initial MO and defer long-term sales to the MO for the next Compliance Period.
• The Commission should reject CalCCA’s request that the “solicitation period” during which the IOUs may not hold concurrent RSP solicitations include the date the solicitation is posted by the IOU through and including the date the final executed agreement under that solicitation is formally approved by the Commission.
• SDG&E requests that the PD should also define the type of solicitations that are restricted and requests that the “solicitations” definition to include sales only and exclude purchases.

SCE:

• SCE urges the Commission to reject CalCCA’s proposal that if the MO deliveries do not begin on January 1, 2023, LSEs should still receive the full percentage value based on the full calendar year of available resources.
• The Commission should reject CalCCA’s argument against establishing bid floors for the MO because CalCCA does not have all the necessary information to make this argument, since SCE’s proposal was confidential.
• The Commission should reject CalCCA’s proposed schedule for the MO solicitation because it does not take into account (1) the time necessary for Commission review and approval of the MO Pro Forma contracts before initiating the MO solicitations; and (2) the time necessary for Commission approval of Tier 1 Advice Letters containing executed MO Pro Forma contracts before deliveries begin.
• SCE agrees with CalCCA that the “solicitation period” should be clarified; however,SCE disagrees with CalCCA that the “solicitation period” should be from the date the solicitation is posted by the IOU through and including the date that the Commission approves the final executed agreement under that solicitation. SCE believes a reasonable amount of time for the “solicitation period” is from the date the offers are submitted in the MO until the date Offerors are notified whether their offers have been selected.
• The Commission should confirm that the restriction to run concurrent solicitations only applies to the sale of RECs.

PG&E:

• PG&E agrees with CalCCA’s request to remove a long-term sale requirement to allow the MO program to expediently commence in 2023.
• The Commission should reject CalCCA’s recommendation to remove bid floors, claiming that if the Commission orders that no bid floor applies, bidders would not put their best foot forward in responding to the solicitation, thus encouraging artificially low bids and minimizing the opportunity for MO sales revenue to reduce PCIA portfolio costs.
• CalCCA’s proposed schedule is unreasonable and incompatible with Commission rules, and states that the IOUs, not CalCCA, are in the best position to assess and propose a MO schedule.
• The Commission should reject CalCCA’s recommendations for the PD to be revised to require IOUs to offer “makeup” volumes from January 2023 forward to the pro forma’s delivery start date through one of various means, including different percentages to account for volumes from this period of time, or requiring IOUs to fulfill those volumes through other means. PG&E argues that these proposals are inconsistent with D. 21-05-030, OP 8 (a) ordering IOUs to offer as part of the MO process all “PCIA-eligible RPS energy remaining after a Voluntary Allocation.”

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